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Introduction
The determining principles of Chinese foreign policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century are, amongst others, peace, development, and cooperation (heping, fazhan, hezuo). 1 Although promoting peace is a universal goal, hardly any state emphasizes its peaceful and defensive orientation as definitely as the People's Republic of China (PRC). 2 The concept of a harmonious society (hexie shehui) further highlights the constant significance of economic success and the general political direction in China. A harmonious Chinese society In the theoretical debate, offensive realists have decisively influenced the discussion and have emphasized the possibility of a coming conflict between China and the United States. 9
From their perspective, China is a revisionist state like all great powers and seeks hegemony in the system. 10 In contrast, Alastair Iain Johnston states that China is increasingly conforming to international and regional norms, and for that reason China is not a revisionist 3 See Lam, Willy: Socialism with a Harmonious Face: Hu Jintao's Plan for Reform, in: China Brief, Vol. 4, No. 20 (2004) But what are the causes of war, and under which circumstances is war justified? Although the Chinese understanding of Just War has rarely been studied, 13 Johnston, Alastair I.: China as a Status Quo Power?, in: International Security, Vol. 27, No.4 (2003) , pp. 5-56. 12 Friedberg, Aaron L.: The Future of U.S.-China relations. Is Conflict inevitable?, in: International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2005) , p. 8. As Aaron Friedberg, one of the leading US experts on Chinese foreign policy, said: "Our host, […] , have asked us to debate the question of whether China seeks to dominate Asia and in fact to reduce or push out the United States. My short answer to this question is, I don't know, […] . Analysis, New York 2001 [1959 . With a broader focus on security, see also Buzan, Barry: People, States and Fear: an agenda for international security in the post-cold war era, 2nd edition, New York 1991. Due to these two aspects, psychological warfare has a higher significance than physical warfare or bloodshed. The authors furthermore compare Chinese warfare with an art and confront the "war as art" with the Western understanding of "war as tactics." According to this idea, victory is not gained through violence but through stratagem. 25 Adelmann and Shih focus primarily on the question of how war is waged, and they conclude that the means of war are intended to avoid the use of military force. This justifies their argument that from a Chinese perspective violence and war are condemned and outlawed ("war was seen as an aberration"). From the question of how war is waged, Adelmann and Shih draw their conclusion about the general meaning of war. But this argumentation raises the following criticism.
Adelmann and Shih's analysis responds the question of whether war (or violence) is part of the Chinese military tradition. They identify the idea of psychological warfare-which basically means war is war without fighting ("victory by stratagem, not force")-as the greatest difference from the West. Like that of Fairbank, Adelmann and Shih's argumentation attempts to develop a pacifist idea of war, but this pacifist doctrine cannot explain the fact that even in China war is possible. This is probably why Adelmann and Shih chiefly examine Chinese strategic thinking, which was founded by the military strategists, especially Sunzi.
For Sunzi, however, the use of force constitutes a real option. But under which circumstances is the use of force justified? The hiatus which arises at this point and which is not sufficiently explained with reference to defensive warfare is the question regarding the justi- Based on three general elements of strategic culture, 33 Johnston distinguishes the central paradigm of a Chinese strategic culture as follows: firstly, the condition of war shall be condemned and avoided; secondly, the enemy shall be cultivated; and thirdly, force is only used as a last resort. If armed force has to be used against external security threats, it should generally be defensive. Johnston draws the conclusion that force is not respected as an effective instrument and is quite contrary to a moral and virtuous basis for the domestic political system, which in turn leads to a peaceful society. But in view of the military strategists, Johnston reconsiders:
In the military texts the use of the military instrument (bing 兵) is considered highly efficacious, indeed necessary, for dealing with security threats. This is not to say that war or violence is the sole basis of the state security, but there is a strong expectation that violence inheres in human social processes, […] . Thus the status of violence in these texts is higher than implied in the secondary Western and Chinese literature. It is also higher than implied in the Confucian-Mencian notion of internal rectification as the basis for external security that infuses much of this secondary literature." 34 Johnston opposes the pacifist doctrine with a realist approach which characterizes the use of force as a social phenomenon. Thus, Johnston joins realism with Chinese culture. This forgotten connection is one of his greatest achievements. Scobell's "Cult of Defense" consists of "three core philosophical elements and four guiding strategic principles." 47 The former make up the central elements of Chinese military tradition, which also represent the Confucian tradition: firstly, the Chinese are peace-loving people; secondly, they are not aggressive or expansionist; thirdly, they use force only in the case of self-defense. The latter four guiding principles underline the fact that China (1) dition to State Y. Although this particular "punishment" is considered to be different from a conventional war, it still implies the use of force. In other words, the Confucians legitimize punitive warfare because of a "potential danger." In this context the idea of punishment extends beyond the understanding of war. Hence, the internal collapse of one state is automatically understood as a threat to another state. When a state tries to smooth this danger out, it means sending a "punitive expedition." So the case of "punitive expeditions" appears to be similar to the idea of prevention; however, punishment is fundamentally contrary to prevention. Its essence lies in the fact that the implementation of the penalty follows the crime. The different interpretations of "punitive expedition" as, for instance, annexation, rebellion, defense, or prevention, disguise the actual understanding of war which is justified by the Confucians. Most reviews and analyses of the Chinese concept of Just War use "punitive expedition" as the common translation of the Confucian term for a justified war. Even though this translation is literally correct, it seems inappropriate in regard to the context.
The internal organization of the political order is the main subject in Confucianism, even with regard to the justification of war. Thus, it makes sense to use the expression "war of order" instead of "punitive expedition".
The Even though the military is the first need which is dispensable, it is still part of the righteous government. It follows that the use of force is not excluded a priori. Although war is not a classic Confucian topic, there still exist criteria which obviously justify a "war of order."
Military Strategists
The most influential writings about Chinese military thought were written during the Warring States Period, in which war and cruelty occurred frequently. With some exceptions, the vast majority of the military classics were also created in this period. 73 These military classics deal with the state's organization and administration. Similar to the works of the Confucians, these classics focus on the emperor's position and ideal leadership as their starting point. With the exception of Sunzi, all military strategists firstly discussed the internal organization of political order and then emphasized the necessity of armed forces to guarantee stability and security within the state. The authors chiefly stressed the analysis of tactics which could be used during a war, for instance, the means of the emperor and the position of his army or his general. A fundamental goal of the military strategists was to limit the use of force. War is still condemned in these writings, but it is argued that Just Wars need to be waged. Military strategies were, therefore, necessary, especially when victory should be realized with a minimum of costs. In contrast to the Confucian writings, the relation between wen and wu 74 -more precisely, the role of the military within the social order-is the most important topic of the military classics. According to the methods of Sima, the basis of authority is not only a harmonious society, but also warfare: "Authority comes from warfare, not from harmony among men." 75 Although the internal order still consists of harmony, the external position of a kingdom can only be secured with the help of warfare. "Within, [the government] gains the love of the people, the means by which it can be preserved. Outside, it acquires awesomeness, the means by which it can wage war." Nevertheless, war may not be waged arbitrarily, because this would cause the decline of authority. "Thus, even though a state may be vast, those who love warfare will inevitably perish. Even though calm may prevail under Heaven, those who forget warfare will certainly be endangered!" Sunzi also mentions that war is a social phenomenon but possesses destructive powers at the same time. "Warfare is the greatest affair of state, the basis of life and death, the Way [Tao] to survival or extinction. It must be thoroughly pondered and analyzed." 76 As a result, the reasons for war are of particular significance.
Wuzi, for instance, specifies five general reasons for war: to protect the emperor's reputation, to gain benefits, hatred, civil unrest, and war as a result of famine. Moreover, Wuzi points out five types of war: Just Wars which save mankind from chaos; aggressions which are exercised with the acceptance of the people; wars which mobilize the army out of rage; wars which are waged only for profit; and "contrary wars" which are fought even when the people are in a state of emergency or weakened because of famine. 77 The concept of Just War was not only a political instrument for the military strategists but also the foundation for the development of their strategies. The general criteria for Just War mentioned by the different military strategists are as follows: the emperor's authority, which finally decides on the use of force; war as defensive warfare and therefore as a direct reaction to an aggressive attack by another state; and the use of force as a last resort. In addition, war has to be useful for the people, because the people guarantee the emperor's power. 78 Yet another aspect expressed by the military strategists is that war should only be fought when victory is certain. The aim of war is victory or-in a broader sense-peace. Chin. 文 (wen) means civil; Chin. 武 (wu) means military. These characters describe the two sides of the dilemma. Sunzi does not clarify what "to attack the enemy's strategy" or "to disrupt its alliances" exactly means. One interpretation could be that Sunzi supports mainly diplomatic solutions, but in the context of other statements from the Art of War a more offensive reading is possible. The various Sunzi commentators point out that "to attack the strategy" can also mean to destroy the enemy's material resources. 82 In addition, the enemy should be attacked while he is still planning the aggression; in other words, the potential threat should be nipped in the bud. Consequently, this preventive idea seems necessary to ensure that force is actually used as a last resort. With regard to the matter of defense, the potential threat of an aggressive strategy is reason enough to "actively defend" oneself. Knowledge about the enemy's situation, army, and potential behavior is, therefore, of particular importance in order to gain vic- , the orthodox may be used in unorthodox ways, and an orthodox attack may be unorthodox when it is unexpected precisely because it is orthodox-whereas a flanking or indirect assault would be thereby be considered normal therefore orthodox. 87 The surprise effect of flexible warfare is a decisive guarantee of victory. Hence, the pragmatic counterpart of deception as a strategic basis of warfare lies in the use of unorthodox tactics.
Neither deception nor unorthodox measures are condemned; these means of war are justified by the military strategists.
83
Sun Tzu: The Art of War, XIII, 3-4.
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Sun Tzu: The Art of War, I, 17 and I; 18-27: "Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him.
[…] Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you. These are the strategist's keys to victory. It is not possible to discuss them beforehand." The claim to authority was regionally unlimited, because harmony did not know boundaries. Outside of China there was no other reliable political self-organization, and China's neighbors in the periphery were described as barbarians or vassal states.
The Chinese tended to think of their foreign relations as giving expression externally to the same principles of social and political order that were manifested internally within the Chinese state and society.
[…] China's external order was so closely related to her internal order that one could not long survive without the other; when the barbarians were not submissive abroad, rebels might more easily arise within. Most dynasties collapsed under the twin blows of "inside disorder and outside calamity." 91
Because of the boundless claim to authority, the Chinese tradition lacks a distinction between international and domestic conflicts; both are primarily considered as disturbances of harmony. Peace is, therefore, the absence of disturbance-in other words synonymous with 88 For his comments and suggestions on the following two sections, I would like to thank Dr. Oliver Lembcke. Many aspects were also presented together at the DVPW-Arbeitskreis "Politik und Religion", 27-29 June 2008 in Berlin. 
24
Godehardt: The Chinese Meaning of Just War and Its Impact on the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China 25 harmony, which is represented by the emperor. Peace, however, is not a political concept; 92 it cannot be actively founded by the emperor. But if the harmony is challenged, the emperor has the duty to restore political order, an act which can also include the use of violence.
Consequently, the traditional focus on the maintenance of political order is central to the Chinese understanding of Just War, because continuous disorder is considered more dangerous than the use of military violence. "The internal disintegration of a nation is more dangerous than its external aggression […] . Furthermore, internal disintegration is likely to invite aggression from without and in that case the State is defenceless for there is no unity within." 93 It follows that violence and war are justified when the emperor intends to eliminate the disorder. In this context, the justified war is referred to as a "punitive expedition."
Furthermore, the aggression of another political community must not precede the actual use of violence, because it is the maintenance of political order which can lead to a military intervention, even when it is the domestic decline of political order in a neighboring state that entails a potential threat. Moreover, a military intervention can be raised with the intention to contain the potential danger of anarchy. In these cases of preventive intervention it makes sense to use the expression "war of order" instead of "punitive expedition"; the It is conspicuous that the Chinese perspective is mainly determined by Chinese academics and official statements which, amongst other things, refer to the peaceful writings of Confucius. 110 The benign character of Chinese politics is, therefore, found not only in official documents and statements but also in Chinese political analyses, which are keen to spread the image of a peaceful China into the academic world. This Chinese self-perception needs to be questioned through an analysis of the Chinese traditional writings. Alastair Iain Johnston, for instance, focuses on the peace-loving (Confucian) and military (military classics) orientation of the Chinese tradition, but in the end he mainly emphasizes the military tradition in China (parabellum paradigm). This, however, stands in contrast to his discussion about the contemporary political intentions of the PRC, where he argues that China today represents a status quo power. How is this change from the traditional "parabellum paradigm" to a China as a "status quo power" possible? The Chinese self-perception and others' percep-tions of China, as well as the connection between Chinese culture and current Chinese polices, need to be analyzed further. "It is inadvisable to make hasty judgements that the State concerned is unable to protect its own citizen and rush to intervene." 115 The primacy of stability in traditional China converges today with the classical paradigm of sovereignty on the international level.
The concept of a harmonious world underlies Chinese efforts to actively influence the international as well as regional order. This concept, introduced by Hu Jintao, constitutes a general change of policy in China, because Deng Xiaoping's reform policy was primarily domestically oriented. Deng's primary goal was to regain a stable economy. Therefore, his foreign policy followed the motto "hiding one's capacity while biding one's time" (taoguang yanghui yousuo zuowei). 116 With the idea of a harmonious society and world, "Beijing is trying to synchronize its internal and external outlooks, so that its international behaviours are no more 113 than extensions of its self-belief and domestic politics." 117 Nevertheless, China's pursuit of dominance is still mainly dependent on its domestic strength, and its domestic development needs a peaceful and quiet international environment. Further, the establishment of a harmonious world depends on the particular political context. Internationally, China presents itself as a status quo power, but on the regional level, China seeks regional-power status by means of increased dependencies and regional engagement. Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, a change in China's reputation in the region has been observable. As David Shambaugh states, "most nations in the region now see China as a good neighbour, a constructive partner, a careful listener, and a nonthreatening regional power." 118 China signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003 and is also a member state of the East Asian Summit (EAS).
This growing engagement as well as the economic dependence between ASEAN and China would increase the costs for the ASEAN member states in the event of a conflict were they to decide for the United States and against China. "China has made a concerted effort in the last decade to cultivate economic and security partners in Southeast Asia, reassuring nations that China's development presents long-term economic opportunities and does not threaten their security interests." 119 China's regional policy of "cooperative dependencies" seems to have successfully established a harmonious society in a harmonized region. In this respect, China certainly represents a rising power (see Chart 2). 
Conclusion
The correlation between harmony and stability is a central aspect of political thinking in traditional China. Peace is synonymous with harmony and describes the absence of disturbances. Consequently, the use of violence can be justified because the political order needs to be restored. Even though violence stands in contrast to the ideal of a virtuous emperor, wars in respect of order are Just Wars. Therefore, political order is the independent variable which determines whether the use of violence or war is justified.
The power of a Confucian emperor is regionally unlimited. Harmony does not know boundaries. The emphasis on boundaries, territory, and sovereignty distinguishes the mod- 
